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Africa

Africa: Did the Tumaini Initiative Exceed Its Mandate?

todayOctober 10, 2024 2

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Debating Ideas reflects the values and editorial ethos of the African Arguments book series, publishing engaged, often radical, scholarship, original and activist writing from within the African continent and beyond. It offers debates and engagements, contexts and controversies, and reviews and responses flowing from the African Arguments books. It is edited and managed by the International African Institute, hosted at SOAS University of London, the owners of the book series of the same name.

The Tumaini (Hope) Initiative was launched by President Salva Kiir Mayardit of the Republic of South Sudan after realizing that the Rome peace initiative, mediated by Sant Egidio of the Catholic Church, was not yielding results. The forum, which included the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the Holdout Groups (HGs) – rebels who opposed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) – had been ongoing for four years since 2020, without achieving any tangible outcomes.

In May 2024, President Salva requested President William Ruto of Kenya to mediate the conflict between the GoSS and HGs. President Ruto accepted, and the new initiative under the “Tumaini” banner began in Nairobi in June 2024. As the name suggested, the majority of the HGs members were involved in the R-ARCSS negotiations in Addis Ababa and Khartoum between 2017 and 2018. However, the group chose not to sign the agreement at the last minute, insisting that certain issues were not addressed by the R-ARCSS. It was for this reason that the GoSS agreed to reopen the peace agreement to accommodate their views, provided these views were not already covered in the R-ARCSS.

At the time of writing, the situation in Nairobi is reportedly contrary to what was expected in relation to the R-ARCSS. All eight protocols initialed by Tumaini stakeholders are merely replications of the R-ARCSS, with the exception of the protocol on communal violence. This approach has been seen as a contradiction of the Tumaini mandate, which is supposed to address issues not covered by the R-ARCSS. Furthermore, the initiative has proposed new nomenclatures, replacing existing mechanisms. For example, they proposed the National Leadership Council (NLC), Joint Defence Security Board (JDSB), and National Implementation Oversight Committee (NIOC). According to Annex A of the R-ARCSS, the latter two mechanisms are under the Commanders-in-Chief of the warring parties. Though not provided for by the R-ARCSS, the institutionalization of the presidency as a mechanism to bring together R-ARCSS leaders to discuss implementation issues was a positive gesture, which the Tumaini Initiative named the NLC.

The replication of the R-ARCSS by the Tumaini Initiative’s High-Level Mediation for South Sudan led the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO), under the First Vice President of the Republic, Dr Riek Machar Teny, to withdraw from the peace talks in Nairobi. Other R-ARCSS signatories, such as the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) and Opposition Political Parties (OPP), have also raised concerns about areas where Tumaini overlaps with the R-ARCSS. One of the Tumaini negotiators, Pagan Amum Okech, leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-Real (SPLM-R), insisted that Tumaini should be superior to the R-ARCSS because it will address issues that the latter failed to resolve and implement.

It is crucial for the mediators and Tumaini stakeholders to focus on matters that are not part of the R-ARCSS. Besides communal violence, the group should discuss land disputes and power-sharing arrangements to enable their integration into the government. Additionally, the group should concentrate on strengthening the implementation mechanisms and finding solutions for the impediments to the R-ARCSS, which have led to a lack of implementation and frequent extensions. South Sudan has been in a governance transition without general elections since its independence in 2011.

In reality, the R-ARCSS faces many challenges, but three of these are critical and need to be addressed by the Tumaini Initiative: political will, funding, and accountability. Political will is required from the leadership, especially the signatories to the peace agreement, to commit themselves to a smooth transition and the conduct of peaceful, transparent elections.