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Africa

Africa: Horn of Africa – a Conflict Evolving Around Berbera Port

todayJanuary 5, 2024

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A new deal granting landlocked Ethiopia access to a seaport holds potential for a huge upheaval in the Horn of Africa. The breakaway region of Somaliland finds itself in a make-or-break situation.

Under different circumstances, the kind of deal agreed between Ethiopia and the breakaway region of Somaliland would have been fairly straightforward.

One country grants its landlocked neighbor access to a seaport and by extension to international trade — and in return is rewarded a political prize.

But Somaliland is just a de facto country, recognized only by Taiwan.

And since the political prize was nothing less than Ethiopia taking steps towards recognizing Somaliland as a sovereign state, serious repercussions of the deal have been unfolding.

The Somali government in Mogadishu has called its ambassador to Addis Ababa for consultation and released a statement which emphasized that its constitutional power also extends to Somaliland, calling the agreement “null and void.”

“Somalia finds this step to be a clear violation against its sovereignty and unity,” the statement read.

Port access, airline shares and a promise

At the epicenter of the deal is the commercial port of Berbera, which has recently been significantly expanded by United Arab Emirates-based port logistics company DP World.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed had been calling for sea access for months — with a rhetoric that led to fears of a fresh dispute with neighboring Eritrea.

However, the Somali government in Mogadishu, which has little control over the north-western breakaway province, was caught in surprise when Ethiopia and Somaliland stroke their deal on New Year’s Day.

Besides using the port for international trade, Ethiopia also wants to lease land from Somaliland on which to build a naval base.

Somaliland, in return, gets an equivalent value in shares of Ethiopian Airlines. Moreover, Abiy’s government promises to “make an in-depth assessment towards taking a position regarding the efforts of Somaliland to gain recognition.”

While the deal’s wording leaves much room for interpretation, any diplomatic revaluation for Somaliland’s cause would further weaken the Somali central government in Mogadishu.

A spat between Ethiopia and Somalia — and beyond

“This signing of memorandum of understanding will upside down the relationship of the two countries back to the era of Siad Barre administration,” Surafeal Getahun, who teaches political and international relations at Dire Dawa University in Eastern Ethiopia, told DW.

“This leads the entire region to a great crisis. And it will endanger the relationship between the countries in the region.”

Somalia unsuccessfully attempted to reconquer the Ogaden border region from Ethiopia during the 22-year reign of Siad Barre, who was Somalia’s dictator until 1991.

Aside from a full-scale war in 1977-78, Somalia deployed rebel militias in what is now Ethiopia’s Somali region.

However, there’s reason to doubt that Mogadishu would engage in an armed confrontation with Ethiopia, a country whose military spending is three times higher and is part of the coalition fighting the Al-Shabab militant organization within Somalia.

“What can they do with their big neighbor?” asked Medhane Tadesse, who lectures at King’s College in London and Institut des Mondes Africains in Paris.

“They might involve in destabilization strategies by working with other countries like gulf powers. Probably supporting being a gateway for Ethiopian insurgent groups. But mainly, I think their main agency would be international diplomacy,” Tadesse told DW.

Somalia has received backing from the European Union, the United States and the African Union, stressing its territorial integrity.

Ethiopia’s new partnership with the UAE

According to Medhane Tadesse, the issue is directly connected with regional geopolitics, namely with a Saudi-led security initiative founded in 2020 with other Red Sea countries.

“Both the United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia are not part of it,” Tadesse pointed out. “There has been some kind of evolution of two broad camps. And Ethiopia and Somalia are not in the same camp.”

The UAE has been playing an active role of the Saudi-led intervention in the Yemeni civil war. Mainly through local groups, the South of the war-struck country is under UAE influence.

Just 250 kilometers (155 miles) further south lies the Somaliland’s port of Berbera, significantly developed by an Emirati company.

With another ally, the UAE would increase their influence on both sides of the Gulf of Aden, the gateway to the global trade route through the Red Sea and Suez Canal.

Teaming up with Ethiopia makes sense for the UAE for various reasons, as Tadesse explained.

“They wanted the hinterland, they wanted that access. But more than that, it’s the security component as well. It’s an alliance making. It’s easy for the Emirates to work with Ethiopia for their own interest,” said Tadesse.

“And the Ethiopian prime minister is also interested in keeping power at any cost. So he’s looking for any financial support and he can get it from the UAE.”